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1. Introduction  
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a dedicated short range communication (DSRC) 
technology that enables a physically linked world where every object is identified, 
catalogued, and tracked through the use of a RFID tag, comprised of an IC (Integrated 
Circuit) chip and antenna that sends information to the RFID reader in response to a 
wireless probe. In contrast to barcodes, RFID does not require line of sight or contact 
between readers (also known as interrogators) and tagged objects. The main advantages of 
RFID systems are price efficiency and accuracy of stock management. In addition to 
emerging applications in retail and distribution, RFID has gradually been adopted and 
deployed in other service industries, including aircraft maintenance; baggage handling; 
laboratory procedures; security; and healthcare.  Although RFID technology has obvious 
advantages, including increased visibility and fast identification, there are still some 
problems, including limitation of RFID tag’s hardware storage and memory; threat of 
counterfeiting; and other security and privacy issues (Juels, 2006). 
This study focuses on the counterfeiting problem of RFID technology in supply chain 
management (SCM).  This problem appears as RFID tag cloning and fraud attacks (Gao et.al, 
2004) that lead to financial losses and loss of trust and confidence. The RFID tag cloning and 
fraud attacks can hinder the adoption and acceptance of RFID technology (Choi et.al, 2008; 
Lehtonen, 2007). Therefore trust management plays an important role as an instrument of 
decision making whether a system is worthwhile to be used with a minimal risk (Kutvonen, 
2005). The tradeoff of trust is considered against risk handling, security and privacy 
management. The significance of trust in the new emerging ubiquitous technology in a 
context of RFID is critical. Supply chain involves open network connectivities, physical 
products transportation, and transaction management, where trust counts in the selection of 
partners; the selection of software and hardware infrastructure; as well as the adoption of 
communication systems (Derakshan et.al, 2007).  
Public acceptance of RFID implications systems is still an open question due to its current 
limitations and vulnerabilities, (Lehtonen, 2007). In our previous work (Mahinderjit-Singh & 
Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li 2010), we proposed a novel seven layers trust framework 
for RFID-enabled supply chain management (SCM). Our seven-layer trust framework 
provides an approach to establish trustworthiness of large scale tracking systems and 
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usefulness of RFID systems. This framework suggests a few prevention and detection 
mechanisms for a variety of security attacks. Also Mirowski & Harnett (2007) believe that 
RFID cloning and fraud attacks necessitate countermeasures beyond static preventive 
mechanisms. As most existing research studies focused on static preventive models without 
much success, we agree with Mirowski & Harnett (2007) that the detection of cloning and 
fraud attacks is the first line of defense in eliminating these security attacks.  
Our study includes minimization of RFID technology error rates, as well as the 
minimization of predictions of incorrect class labels and the improvement of detection 
accuracy. We argue that a cost-sensitive approach is essential to reduce the risk of 
counterfeiting in SCM. For example, in medical diagnosis of cancer disease, where presence 
of cancer is regarded as either positive (cancer) or negative (no cancer). In this scenario, a 
false–negative (FN) error  is much more serious (and costly) than a false-positive (FP) error. 
The patient could risk his/her life because of this FN error and missing out of the early 
detection and  treatment. Similarly, in RFID clone and fraud detection, false-negative or 
failure of detecting fraud tags is very expensive (e.g. counterfeiting associated loss of 
billions–dollar businesses). This study focuses on closing a current gap in RFID tag cloning 
detection systems, that has not been dealt with in previous studies, namely the analyses of 
system costs in FN and FP errors. 
The objective of a cost-sensitive model in an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to formulate 
the total expected cost for the detection of an intrusion. A cost model should consider the 
trade-offs among all relevant cost factors and provides a basis for making appropriate cost-
sensitive prediction decisions.  A cost model should comply with the well-known Pareto 
principle or the commonly regarded 80-20 rule. Pareto rule or 80-20 rule specifies an 
unequal relationship between inputs and outputs (Shulmeyer & Thomas, 1999). More 
generally, the Pareto Principle is the observation (not law) that most things in life are not 
distributed evenly. For instance, the efforts of 20% for using cost model for counterfeit wines 
detection system could drive 80% of the firm's profits through elimination of counterfeit 
wines bottles in a supply chain. By applying the Pareto distribution rule, we may eliminate 
80% percent of counterfeiting by dealing with the causal factors of the top 20% of the 
reported RFID cloned and fraud tags. In our hypothesis, we denote that solving FN cost is 
more important than solving false positive (FP) cost, and that 20% of effort put into 
detecting the FN cost will lead to an overall system cost reduction of 80%. Our cost model 
does not involve the cost for products reduction due to an attack; for instance losses in wine 
prices due to counterfeit attack. We believe that the usage of a cost model in a cloned 
detector system is able to reduce the chances of counterfeiting as early as in the supply chain 
plant itself. By doing so, there will be zero counterfeit products after any POS (Point of Sale) 
at the retailer site.  
Risk Management (Lin & Varadharajan, 2006) is a process used to identify possible risks and 
setting procedure to avoid the risk, or minimise its impact or setting up a strategy to control 
the risks. Risk management often involves a multi-criteria decision making process in which 
factors such as economic, health, legal and others are appropriately weighted on a course of 
action. Because the decision making process can be complex, there is no one decision 
criterion that must be or is always used. In order to build cost-sensitive IDS models, we 
discuss the relevant cost factors and the metrics used to define them. Cost-sensitive 
modeling for intrusion detection must be performed periodically because cost metrics need 
to deal with changes in information assets and security policies (Lee et.al, 2002). It is 
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therefore important to develop tools that can automatically produce cost-sensitive 
computations for given cost metrics. The three main costs: damage, response, and 
operational cost, must be evaluated and quantified based on factors such as cloning attack 
types and the RFID system environment. Damage cost is a measured loss to the supply 
chain business which has lost the financial benefits due to cloning and fraud attacks. 
Response cost is the cost to countermeasures the cloning and fraud attack in a supply chain 
business. Operational cost is distinguished by the cost of running the detection engine 
providing function in detecting and responding to both cloning and fraud attacks in a RFID 
enabled supply chain environment. Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to construct and 
quantify a cost sensitive model for RFID enabled SCM. The RFID tag cloning and fraud 
attacks are used in simulating the security attacks and in defining the cost factors in the 
RFID-enabled supply chain.  
We use the Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) (Satty, 1990) model to calculate the 
costs and decisions. We have use Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique, which is a 
MCDM tool in distinguishing the best approach and algorithm for preventing and testing 
for RFID tag cloning attacks in SCM. The second aim is to extend the MCDM tool through 
the use of criteria used by supply chain owners when selecting RFID tag cloning and fraud 
prevention techniques. These criteria include acceptance; cost; security; and complexity. 
This cost model is the first of its kind with the aim to counter security attacks such as 
counterfeiting in RFID enabled SCM. The main challenges in the development of the cost 
model are to represent and identify the different types of costs involved in the detection of 
the attacks and to maintain responsiveness to changes in these cost factors. Finally, we 
distinguish the cost properties in a SCM RFID environment. Even though our work is 
focused on RFID tag cloning and fraud, our trust framework and the cost model will be 
transferable for countering other types RFID security attacks.  
The rest of this chapter is constructed as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review and 
describes the related cost models. It also introduces some background on countering RFID 
cloning and fraud attacks. Section 3 explains the design of our cost model for RFID tag 
cloning and fraud detection system. In section 4 we present on how can use MCDM tool to 
quantify the related costs and maintain responsiveness to RFID tag cloning and fraud 
attacks. Section 5 introduces RFID tag cloning and fraud prevention techniques using AHP 
and MCDM tools. Sections 6 discuss the applicability of the proposed models. Section 7 
provides the conclusion and views on future work. 
2. Backgrounds and related work 
In this section we provide an overview of cost sensitive learning and define cloning, fraud 
and counterfeiting problems. We define both RFID tag detection classification and cost 
matrices. Finally, we explain how we could integrate RFID detection and our cost model in 
our proposed seven-layer trust framework.  
Cost-Sensitive Learning is a type of learning in data mining that takes misclassification and 
other types of cost into consideration (Turney, 2002). The goal of this type of learning is to 
minimise total cost. The key difference between cost-sensitive learning and cost-insensitive 
learning is that cost-sensitive learning treats different misclassifications differently (Turney, 
2002). Cost insensitive learning does not take misclassification costs into consideration. The 
goal of this type of learning is to pursue high accuracy when classifying examples into a set 
of known classes. 
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Credit card fraud detection, cellular phone fraud detection and medical diagnoses are 
examples of intrusion detection because intrusion detections deal with detecting abnormal 
behaviour and are typically motivated by cost-saving, and thus typically use cost-sensitive 
modeling techniques. Previous work in the domains of credit card fraud (Lee, W., et.al, 
1999) and cellular phone fraud (Fawcett & Provost, 1997) have applied cost metrics in 
evaluating systems and alternative models, and in formalizing the problems to which one 
may wish to apply data mining technologies. The cost model approach proposed by Lee 
et.al (2000) formulate the total expected cost of an IDS, and present cost-sensitive machine 
learning techniques that can produce detection models that are optimized for user-defined 
cost metrics. The detection technique used by Fan et.al (2000) and Lee et.al (2002) uses an 
inductive rule learner, Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER). 
Their cost model is based on a combination of several factors: The cost of detecting the 
intrusion; the amount of damage caused by the attack; and the operational cost of the 
reaction to the intrusion. Lee et al (2002) claimed that the IDS should have minimal costs. 
However, their work did not consider any related administrative testing costs. Their work 
has been extended by Chen et.al (2008), who claimed that their approach could potentially 
lower the consequential cost in current IDSs. Although the generation of fingerprints as a 
means of authentication increases operational costs associated with the use of IDSs, 
experimental results show that these incremental costs are limited and that overall cost is 
much lower than with the Lee et.al (2002) approach.  
We adopted the two proposed models above. Since our cloned detector will become a 
component integrated in the existing Global Electronic Product Code (EPCglobal) Standard, 
we should be able to use the cost model designed for IDS. Differences include the technique 
used to quantify the cost model and the detection technique and authentication method 
used in our cloned detector. We analyse various authentication methods used for supply 
chain partners and RFID tags by using the MCDM approach. Next, we define cloning, fraud 
and counterfeiting attacks in a RFID system. 
2.1 Problem definition  
2.1.1 Cloning, fraud and counterfeiting definition 
RFID tags clone occurs in the form of cloned tags on fake products or clone tags on genuine 
product. Both types are similar in term of the cloned tags.  
• An RFID tag is a cloned when the tag identification number (TID) and the form factors 
is copied to an empty tags (Lehtonen et.al, 2009).  Hence there will be a same tags data 
structure on two different products.  
• In contrast, fraud is an act of using the cloned tags and adding the serial numbers of 
future EPC codes. These future EPC codes are the codes in the systems, which are yet to 
be tagged to the products.  
• Counterfeiting on the other hand is a more generalised term which includes both the act 
of cloning and fraud of RFID tags and tagging onto fake products in the market for 
personal benefit.  
There are four different attacks that contribute to cloning attack in a RFID system 
(Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li 2010). Skimming attack occur when 
RFID tag are read directly without anyone knowledge. Eavesdropping attack happens when 
an attacker sniffs the transmission between the tag and reader to capture tags data. On the 
other hand, man in the middle attack occurs when a fake reader is used to trick the genuine 
tags and readers during data transmission. RFID tag data could also be altered using this 
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technique and as a result, fraud tags could be generated too. Physical attack which requires 
expertise and expensive equipment takes places in laboratory on expensive RFID tags and 
security embedded tags. 
We will give a definition of clone, fraud and counterfeiting in RFID tag. Let assume set Ti 
contain the RFID genuine tags and Tx contain cloned tags derived from Ti. A genuine tag is 
known as TG and a cloned tag is known as TC. I denote an intruder. A list of attacks (S) 
includes Skimming (S1), Sniffing (S2), Active Attack (S3), Reverse Engineering (S4) and 
Cryptanalysis (S5)  
   Thus; 
       Ti= {TG1, TG2, TG3} 
       Tx= {TC1, TC2} 
       S = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. 
 
Attack Types Attack Pattern Attack Levels Model features 
Skim 
(Juel.A,2005) 
(Dimitriou,2005) 
 
Copy å Cloned 
Low 
( Tag, Reader) 
Content 
Timestamp/TTL 
R/W on Tag & Reader 
Eavesdrop 
(Bolotnyy et.al, 
2007) 
(Duc & Park, 
2006) 
 
Copy å Cloned 
Low 
( Tag, Reader, 
DB) 
Content 
Timestamp/TTL 
R/W on Tag & Reader 
Location  
Man-In- The 
middle 
(Juels, 2006) 
(Gao et.al, 2007) 
 
Copy å Cloned
Alter å Fraud  
High 
( Tag, Reader, 
DB) 
Content 
Timestamp/TTL 
R/W on Tag & Reader 
Location  
Physical  
(Bono.S, 2005) 
(Nohl.K, 2008) 
 
Copy å Cloned
Alter å Fraud 
High 
( Tag, Reader, 
DB) 
Content 
Timestamp 
R/W on Tag & Reader 
Location  
Table 1. RFID Cloning and Fraud attacks  
Hence TC1 is a clone of TG1; if and only if both tags have identical TIDs (tag identifier) and 
share the same form of characteristics. Once the TIDs are the same, all the data and structure 
of the tag‘s EPC code such as header, manufacturer id, object class and serial number are 
identical, i.e., |TG| = |TC|. A TC exists when I performs S either a single S or a 
combinations of S against TG. S will produce cloning attack. RFID Cloning is a process of 
injecting imitated EPC tags in a normal genuine EPC tags batch TG ⊆  BG and TC ⊆  BC. 
Table 1 shows RFID attacks patterns and its model.  
By analysing the model features of the different attacks types, we can distinguish different 
types of RFID security attacks, different levels of attack (high, low) and the different 
associated compromised RFID components. This model is important for the precise 
understanding of cloning vs. fraud attacks. A cloning attack is generalised as an act of 
copying tag data and structure, whereas a fraud attack involves both copying and altering 
tag data and structure. Based on Table 1, RFID tags compromised by ’Eavesdropping’, ‘Man 
in the middle’ and ‘Physical’ attacks will demonstrate deviants in RFID tag data and 
structure namely tag content tag time ( e.g. timestamp and time to live (TTL) ( Li et.al, 2009) 
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and tag locality.  Next, we define RFID tag cloning and fraud detection classification and a 
cost sensitive model that can be used for RFID tagging. 
2.1.2 RFID tag cloning and fraud detection classification and cost sensitive modeling 
Before applying a cost sensitive model to RFID tagging, a RFID dataset is pre-processed to 
feed into a cloned detector that is based on a classification concept.  Suppose that we have a 
collection, I, of RFID Tags, each labelled as either good or bad, depending on whether or not 
it is associated with legitimate or fake products. The set of all possible classes can thus be 
defined as C = {good, bad}. Bad tags could be either cloned or fraudulent/fake tags. We 
approximate the unknown target function, F: I  × C = {1, 0}. The value of f(i, c) is equal to one 
if the RFID tag, i, belongs to the class c and equal to zero if not. It is now possible to define a 
classifier as an approximation function, M: I ×C = {1, 0}. The objective of the learning task is 
to generate a classifier that produces results as close to that of F as possible. Compute a 
model or classifier, C, by some learning algorithm L that is predicted from the features: 
<fn,……fn-1> 
The target class label is fc, ’cloned‘ . 
Hence, C = L(T), where L is a learning algorithm . Each t Є T is a vector of features, where 
we denote f1 as the ’transaction amount‘ (tranamt), and fn as the target class label, where the 
denoted clone (t) = 0 (legitimate transaction) or 1 (cloned or fraudulent transaction). Given a 
’new unseen’ transaction, x, with an unknown class label, we compute fn(x) = C(x). C serves 
as a clone detector.  Within the context of financial transactions, cost is naturally measured 
in dollars (e.g. US dollar is used in his chapter). However, any unit of measure of utility 
applies here. Hence, the cost model for this domain is based on the sum and average of loss 
caused by cloned and fraudulent tags. We define a set of transactions S, a fixed overhead 
amount, and a cloned detector C (or classifier, C). The overhead amount is the cost of 
running the IDS operation. The total potential loss is the transaction amount (tranamt) losses 
for both cloning and fraudulent transactions. The cost matrix outcomes such as FN, FP, hit 
and true negative (TN) is as shown in Table 2 and is used for distinguishing whether the 
cost is a ‘tranamt’ (t) or an overhead. 
 Total Potential Loss (S) =  ∑ ݐݎܽ݊݉ݐ ሺݐሻ௧ఢ ௌ஼௅ைோ஽ሺ௧ሻ & ௧ఢ ௌிோ஺௎஽ሺ௧ሻୀ௧௥௨௘  (1)  
 
Outcomes Cost (t, Overhead)  
Miss ( False Negative, FN) tranamt (t)  
False Alarm ( False Positive, 
FP) 
Overhead 
0 
If tranamt (t) > overhead 
If tranamt (t)  overhead 
Hit ( True Positive , TP) 
Overhead 
0 
If tranamt (t) > overhead 
If tranamt (t)  overhead 
Normal ( True Negative, TN) 0  
Table 2. Prediction of Cost model using tranmt (t) and overhead  
2.2 Trust framework and IDS 
The deviation of RFID technology based trust takes places when simple soft trust (including 
experience and reputation) is taken up to a higher level known as hybrid trust.  Hybrid trust 
in a RFID system is more than just a hard or security trust based on authentication of soft 
 
www.intechopen.com
A Cost-based Model for Risk Management in RFID-Enabled Supply Chain Applications 207 
 
Fig. 1. Seven Layer Trust Framework [8] 
trust as argued by Lin and Varadharajan (2007). In our definition, trust in a RFID technology 
system is defined as a comprehensive decision making instrument that joins security 
elements in detecting security threats with preventing attacks through the use of basic and 
extended security techniques such as cryptography and human interaction with reputation 
models. Since a trust model that disperses privacy is a weak and non-usable model, our 
trust framework ensures privacy and does not compromise security measurements. In 
addition, we argue that a trust model for a technological system should always include 
human interaction through the use of a feedback and ranking model. Our trust framework 
provides a theoretical solution for the trust gaps discussed in Section 1. In addition, our 
proposed trust framework (Figure 1) functions as : 
• a solution to optimising trustworthiness by employing core functions at three main 
levels: 
a. The RFID system physical level (i.e. tags and readers) security and privacy level 
core functions; 
b. The RFID service core functions at the middleware level through utilisation of 
multiple data integration platforms such as the EPC trust services 
(http://www.epcglobalinc.org ) and  third party software systems such as 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) which can also be used; and  
c. The core functions at application level through use of reputation systems based on 
user interaction experiences and beliefs and  
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• to provide guidelines for designing trust in solving open system security threats. 
2.3 EPCglobal network  
EPCglobal (http://www.epcglobalinc.org), a subsidiary of GS1, has used EPC naming 
conventions to identify and trace products movement using RFID technology . This 
application is named the EPCglobal Network. The EPCglobal Network introduces a few 
dedicated components, such as the Object Naming Service (ONS) and the EPC Information 
Services (EPCIS) that may or may not be needed for future applications (Ranasinghe et.al, 
2007). The ONS functions as an EPC resolution service that provides a look up a service to 
resources that provide further information about an item identified by a particular EPC. The 
ONS uses the standard Domain Name Service (DNS) for resolving EPCs. EPCIS permit 
applications to share and use EPC data across different enterprises. In each application, each 
local company will have its own local database and local EPC-IS. In addition, a Discovery 
Service (DS) (still under development) is a registry which registers incoming and outgoing 
products (Ranasinghe. and Cole, 2007) and functions as a item-level tagging server.  
2.4 Architecture of our cost based cloned detector 
In this section we design a cost based RFID tag cloning detector into our proposed trust 
framework and into the EPCglobal service. Figure 2 gives an outline on how our proposed 
detection system will work in a supply chain environment and in an EPCglobal network.  
The following is a list of assumptions used in our system: 
1. By utilising our proposed seven-layer trust framework, detection functions take place in 
layer-4. 
2. Our trust framework is placed in EPCglobal services. 
3. Local EPC-IS only share information that can be assessed by all assigned supply chain 
partners. Distributed network architecture is employed. Distributed network 
architecture eliminates the problem of information overload and makes it easier to 
exchange information. Manufacturer s and trading partners create and store their own 
serialised information about each and every product in their own local EPC-IS. The 
manufacturer manages and hosts a database that stores information about the 
generation of their products. Trading partners manages their local EPC-IS and store 
information about products movement through the supply chain. This local EPC-IS is 
accessible by all supply chain  partners. Each involved partner makes this information 
available to authorised parties using the  internet.  
4. The Discovery service (DS) record incoming and outgoing product sand track products 
by using item-level tagging. DS functions as a key management server in which it 
generates public keys for System Administrator (SA) testing purposes. EPCglobal DS is 
equipped with a key management mechanism using a specific cryptography algorithm 
for public key encryption (RSA). It stores access control policies that comply with the 
role based access system. A role-based access control (RBAC) system has two phases in 
assigning privileges to an employee: first the employee is assigned one or more roles, 
and hen the role(s) are checked against the requested operation.  
5. Supply Chain (SC) partner authentication is done through a certificate authority (CA) 
service using our trust framework. The partners that need to access the clone detector to 
provide their local certificate to the CA server installed in our trust framework.  
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6. The Object Naming Service (ONS) could be used to point to an address in the 
EPCglobal network where information about the product being questioned is stored. 
This service is important if a product need to be traced and tracked.  
7. Item-level tagging is employed in our scenarios.  
8. Attackers could be either from the organisation or outsiders.They are mainly 8 different 
points used by attacker to inject cloned and fraud in the SCM. 
 
Supplier A Supplier B
Manufacturing
Products Flow Products Flow
Discovery Service
Cost based Cloned Detector
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Fig. 2. Cost based Cloned Detector in a Supply Chain Management and EPCglobal Network 
environment. 
a. An EPC lifecycle begins when a manufacturer tags a product. At the manufacturer’s 
place, EPC tags are fixed to products. These EPC tags are furnished with codes and 
KILL/ACCESS passwords, upfront. 
b. A manufacturer records products information into the local EPC-IS. 
c. The EPC-IS registers EPC knowledge with EPC Discovery Services (DS). 
d. Before the product leaves the manufacturer’s site, the product is fed into the cloning 
detector. 
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e. The result is sent to the manufacturer’s local EPC-IS. If a cloned tag is detected, a trigger 
is sent to the  manufacturer’s SA.  
f. If not, the supplier is requested to move the product to the distributor’s front door. 
g. At the front door, the distributor records the product into their local EPC-IS. 
h. The EPC-IS records with the EPC DS where tags are next fed into the cloning detector.   
i. If a clone is detected, the distributor’s SA is triggered. The alarm log is kept in the DS. 
j. The alarm log is sent to distributor’s local EPC-IS.  
k. Before the products leaves the Distributor’s site (at the back door), the RFID tags are fee 
into the cloning detector again to check for if there have been any cloning or fraudulent 
processes at the distributor site.  
l. Once confirmed as genuine tags, distributor sends the tagged products to the retailer 
site. The same process takes place at the retailer site. 
m. Any supply chain partner can access any other partner’s EPC-IS for tracking and tracing 
purposes. 
2.5 Testing process by system administrators  
In this section we discuss how RFID tag cloning and fraud detection as well as cost 
modelling are supported by our proposed trust framework (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; 
Mahinderjit-Singh & Li 2010). In supply-chain-wide RFID systems, increasingly large data 
volumes are being exchanged, which in turn increases the risk for competitors to intercept 
this information (Gao et.al, 2004). Trust relationships between supply chain suppliers and 
distributors curb cheap RFID tag cloning. RFID tag cloning and fraud detection can be 
detected in a supply chain at an initial stage if there is proper transfer of ownership with 
secure and authorised information exchange. We extend our proposed trust framework to 
establish a cloning and fraud detection system that has an integrated cost sensitive model. 
Our RFID detection system has three main components: collection; detection; and response. 
Collection is the component that collects a RFID event set E that is supplied by different 
supply chain partners. RFID event sets  are then sent to the detection component where the 
information sources are analysed. Several detection functions are performed in this 
component, such as pattern matching; traffic or protocol analysis; finite state transition; etc. 
The response component notifies the system administrator where and when an intrusion 
takes place. Two types of roles, an attacker and a system administrator (SA), are considered 
in current IDSs and are defined below. 
Attackers attempt to gain unauthorised access to computer systems, tend to be malicious 
and possess a wide range of tools such as unauthorised RFID readers for performing the 
unethical acts of reading and manipulating genuine RFID tags to produce fake tags. Their 
behaviour is potentially harmful to the supply chain system. Almost 80% of attackers are the 
employees within a supply chain (P.Marcellin , 2009) 
System administrators (SAs) take charge of protecting the system and are minimising the 
costs of network management; system maintenance; and excessive use of resources. They 
are appointed and authorised to examine enterprise networks from attackers’ perspectives, 
and use vulnerability testing tools that are the same as or similar to those used by hackers. 
Their objectives are to help an enterprise evaluate its security level, and identify the 
vulnerable elements that need to be repaired. 
Employment of layer 5 of our trust framework, the auditing module, supports the testing 
functions performed by SAs. Authentication and identification processes, applied through 
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any authentication method or strong security protocol for identification purposes, begin 
prior to the SA accessing the system. After accessing the system, the SAs perform security 
tests and use testing techniques to identify malicious RFID tags. The security protocol 
concurrently calculates the key within the Discovery Service (DS) and matches it with any 
malicious RFID tag keys (a pre-shared secret managed by the SA). The tags are then sent to a 
cost based cloning detector for security testing. 
When the cloning detector finds a cloned tag, the alert system is triggered: First, the system 
tests for the existence of a secret key in the tag. If present, it treats it as a security-testing tag 
and executes the second step. If not, the tag is considered as cloned and the response 
component starts to inform the SA. In the second step, with the tag treated as a security 
testing tag, the validating algorithm is used to verify whether the shared and secret keys are 
identical. If they are identical, the response component does not generate an alarm to alert 
the SA, but logs the occurrence. If they are not identical, the security-testing tag is 
considered as a malicious attempt to forge the secret key. An alarm is generated to alert the 
SA to the attack of the protected system and suitable actions are taken to avoid system loss. 
Section 3 presents our proposed cost model. 
3. Proposed cost model for RFID cloning detector 
In this section, we discuss our proposed cost sensitive cost model and how we derived its 
algorithm. We use Bayes rule to forms the foundation of pattern recognition and embodies 
the definition of conditional probability. Bayes theorem is essentially an expression of 
conditional probabilities. More or less, conditional probabilities represent the probability of 
an event occurring given evidence. To better understand, Bayes Theorem can be derived 
from the joint probability of ci and x (i.e. P(ci,x)) as follows: 
 P(ci, x) = P (ci|x)P(x) ; P(x,ci) = P(x|ci) P(ci)  (1) 
where P(ci|x) is referred to as the posterior; P(x|ci) is known as the likelihood, P(ci) is the 
prior and P(x) is generally the evidence and is used as a scaling factor. Therefore, it is handy 
to remember Bayes Rule as: 
 P (ci, x)=  
௉ሺ௖௜ሻ ௉ሺ௖௜|௫ሻ௉ሺ௫ሻ  (2) 
In practice, the same type of misclassification error may have different cost impacts 
depending on the object to be classified, contrary to the fixed misclassification cost 
approach, where costs remain constant regardless of the data to be classified. As a caveat, 
we have used US dollars (US$) as a measure when discussing the RFID domain, but these 
costs can be converted to some other meaningful unit of measure of utility that may be more 
appropriate for the IDS case. 
 R(ߙ݅|ݔሻ ൌ  ∑ ܥ݆݅ሺݔሻܲ ሺ݆ܿ|ݔሻ௡௝ୀଵ  (3) 
 R(ߙ݅|ݔሻ ൌ  ∑ ܯ݆݅ሺݔሻܲ ሺ݆ܿ|ݔሻ௡௝ୀଵ  (4) 
where the ܥ݆݅  is the misclassification cost function taking into account the properties of the 
data point x and ܯ݆݅  is the test  cost function taking into account the properties of the data 
point x 
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We examine the major costs factors associated with a SCM cloned tag detector, which 
include: misclassification cost due to successful intrusions initiated by attackers; Response 
Cost due to these intrusions; and the Testing costs associated with SA testing of 
authentication methods. We identify the following major cost factors associated to intrusion 
detection: Damage Cost; Response Cost; and Operational Cost.  
a. Damage Cost (Dcost) characterises the amount of Damage to a target resource 
caused by an attack when intrusion detection is unavailable or ineffective. There 
are two different Damage Costs, DcA(e) and DcS(e). DcA(e) is the Damage caused 
by hackers and may harm the system. DcS(e)is the amount of security testing cost 
associated with the SA’s function that may Damage the system. 
b. Response Cost (Rcost) is the cost of acting upon an alarm or log entry that indicates 
a potential intrusion. There are two different Response Costs, Rcܣ(e) and RcS(e). 
RcS(e) is the Response Cost for recovery from the testing performed by the SA. 
c. Operational Cost (OpCost) is the cost of processing the stream of events that are 
monitored by an IDS and of analyses of related activities, made available through 
the application of intrusion detection models. 
The detection outcome e is one of the following: false negative (FN); false positive (FP); true 
positive (TP); or true negative (TN). The costs associated with these outcomes (outlined in 
Table 3) are known as consequential costs (CCost), as they are incurred as a consequence of 
prediction. CCost is the cost summation of Damage and Response Costs. The terms used in 
our cost model are as following: 
 
Detection 
Outcomes 
CCost Condition  
 
FN’ 
 
 ∑ ܦܿܣ ሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′஺  +  ∑ ܧ͵ ܦܿܵ௘ ∈ா′ௌ ሺ݁ሻ 
 0൑ ܧ͵ ൑ 1 
 
 
 
FP’ 
 ∑ ܴܿܣ௘ ∈ா′஺  + ∑ ܲሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′ேைோெ  
 
0 
If  DcA (e) ൒ Rcܣ (e), e  E’A 
 
If  DcA (e) < Rcܣ (e), e  E’A 
 
TP’ 
 ∑ ܴܿܣ௘ ∈ா′஺  + ∑ ܧͶ ܦܿܵሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′ௌ  
 
0൑ ܧͶ ൑ 1 ∑ ܦܿܣ ሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′஺   
 ∑ ܧ͵ ܦܿܵሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′ௌ஺  + ∑ ܲሺ݁ሻ௘ ∈ா′ேைோெ  
0൑ ܧ͵ ൑ 1 
 
 
If  DcA (e) ൒ Rcܣ (e), e  E’A 
 
 
 
If  DcA (e) < Rcܣ (e), e  E’A 
 ∀ ∈ E’ SA 
TN’ 0  
Table 3. Cost Model associated with FN, FP, TP , and TN outcome as Consequential Cost  
(CC) 
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DcA : Damage cost of attacker 
DcS : Damage cost of system administrator 
Rcܣ : Response cost of attacker 
OcA : Operation cost of attacker 
OcS : Operation cost of SA 
P : Penalty cost rate of positive false detection 
q1 : Negative false detection rate 
q2 : Positive false detection rate 
Our proposed decision tree algorithm objective is in reducing misclassification cost for the 
cloned and fraud detection problem. Once the algorithm have achieved this objective, the 
cost model which calculates the total cost for cloning and fraud tags will be employed.A 
decision tree algorithm could be made cost sensitive by selecting those attributes that have 
highest gain at each stage of the tree building process (Ling et, al, 2006). The gain is defined 
as: 
 Gain = priorCost – cCost – attribCost  x N (5) 
priorCost = cost of misclassification before the split 
cCost    = cost of misclassification  after the split 
attribCost = cost of evaluating the attribute over which the split is taking place. 
N = number of instances. 
 currentCost = ∑ ∑  ሺ௡௝ୀ଴௡௜ୀ଴ ܰ כ ݀݅ݏݐ݆ ሻ כ ܥ݆݇  (6)  
where: n is the number of values that the attribute can take , 
N is the number of instances or RFID tags , 
D is the number of attributes, 
distj is the probability of class value j ܥ݆݇ is the cost of misclassifying an instance of class j as that of class 
k, where k is the dominating class of the split. 
T is training dataset 
Given a distribution for c classes, the dominating class I for that node is calculated as 
follows:  
 arg min cost =  ∑   distj כ ܥ݆݅௖௝ୀ଴  (7) 
We would not explain further on our proposed algorithm and its evaluation in this chapter 
and focus more on the cost model instead.  
We can now define the cost model for the cloning detection system .When evaluating a 
system over some labelled test set E, where each event, e ∈ E, has a label of normal or one of 
the cloned , we define consequential cost ( CCost) and cumulative cost of the IDS as follows: 
 Consequential Cost (CC) =  ∑ ሺ ܦܿܣ ൅  ܴܿܣ ሻ௘ ∈ா    (8) 
     Total Cost (E) =  ∑ ሺ ܥܥ݋ݏݐሺ݁ሻ ൅  ܱ݌ܥ݋ݏݐሺ݁ሻሻ௘ ∈ா     (9) 
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 TotalCost (e) =  ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ ܿ݋ݏݐ כ  ∑ ሺ∑ ܦܿܣ ሺ݁ሻ ൅௝்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ  RcA(e)+ OcA(e))        (10) 
 TotalCost (e) = ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ݐܿ݋ݏݐ כ  ∑ ሺ∑ ܦܿܵ ሺ݁ሻ ൅௝்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ OcS(e))  (11) 
   DcA (e) ≥ Rcܣ (e), e ∈ E’A (12) 
It may not always be possible to fold Damage and Response Costs into the same 
measurement unit. Instead, each should be analysed using its own relative scale. We must, 
however, compare and then combine these costs so that we can compute CCost(e) for use in 
the calculation of Cumulative Cost as shown in (2) and (3). Cost total is categorised in two 
parts: 
• the total costs associated with attacks; and  
• the total cost associated with SA testing.  
Based on equations (7) and (8), N is the number of training datasets and T is the number of 
tags attacked. The overall total cost is calculated as a sum of all costs associated with all 
compromised RFID tags. In Table 4 and Table 5 extends the cost matrix outcome to predict 
the total cost of detection vs. non-detection of an attack vs. no attack. Table 4 shows the 
misclassification cost matrix for attackers and Table 5 displays the test cost matrix associated 
with the SA role. The explanations are discussed below. 
Misclassification cost ( Cij) 
 
 Attack No Attack
Detection RcA +  OcA RcA +  OcA  + Pe 
No detection ܦܿܣ +  OcA OcA 
Table 4. 2x2 cost matrix for attacks detection  
SA testing cost ( Mij) 
 
 Attack No Attack
Detection DcS +  Pe + OcS 0 
No detection ܦܿܵ  OcS 
Table 5. 2x2 cost matrix for SA testing detection 
Detection algorithms of all kinds often create false positives. For example, an RFID IDS may 
detect a 'cloned' where there are only some RFID tags that look like a ‘cloned’ to the 
algorithm is being used. When developing detection algorithm, the trade-off between false 
positives and false negatives threshold values can be varied to make the algorithm more 
restrictive or more sensitive. Restrictive algorithms risk rejecting true positives while more 
sensitive algorithm risk accepting false positives.   
Detection algorithms of all kind often create misses as well. For example, if in a medical 
diagnosis, if a doctor fails to detect cancer in a patient that is a false negative. When 
developing detection algorithms or tests, a balance must be chosen between the risks of false 
negative and false positives. Usually there is a threshold of how close a match to a given 
sample must be achieved before the algorithm reports a match. The higher this threshold is, 
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the more false negatives and fewer false positives exist.  The description on each value of 
true positive (TP), false negative (FN), false positive (FP) and true negative (TN) costs are 
listed below:  
TP Cost 
If an attack occurs and the IDS detects it successfully, the associated cost is ((1−q1)) RcA + 
OcA. TP Cost is incurred in the event of a correctly classified cloned tag, and involves the 
cost of detecting the clone and possibly responding to it. To determine whether a response 
will be needed, RCost and DCost must be considered. If the Damage done by the attack to 
resource r is less than RCost, then ignoring the attack reduces the overall cost. Therefore, if 
RCost(e) > DCost(e), the intrusion is not responded to other than logging its occurrence, and 
the loss is DCost(e). If RCost(e) ا DCost(e), the intrusion is acted upon and the loss is limited 
to RCost(e). Because this state is the opposite state to a false negative detection, the detection 
rate can be derived as (1 − q1). OcA is the default cost if the IDS is settled and the RcA is 
generated because the IDS detects malicious tags. 
FN Cost  
FN Cost is the cost of not detecting a cloned attack. When the system falsely decides that a 
RFID tag is not cloned and does not respond to it, the attack will succeed, and the target 
resource will be Damaged. The FN Cost is therefore defined as the Damage Cost associated 
with the attacker (DcA ) or the Damage Cost associated with the system administrator DcS, 
related to event e. The expected cost in this scenario is q1 (DcA + OcA). OcA is the default 
cost if the IDS is settled and DcA occurs because the IDS fails to detect malicious packets. q1 
is a negative false detection rate. 
FP Cost 
FP Cost is incurred when an event is incorrectly classified as an attack, i.e., when e = (normal, 
p, r) is misidentified as e’ = ( a’, p’, r’) for some attack a. If RCost(e’_)2 DCost(e’), a response 
will ensue and the Response Cost, RCost(e’), must be accounted for. In this instance, since 
normal activities may be disrupted due to an unnecessary response, a false alarm should be 
penalized. For our discussion, we use PCost(e) to represent the penalty cost of treating a 
legitimate event e as an intrusion. For example, if e is aborted, PCost(e) can be the Damage 
Cost of a DOS attack on resource r, because a legitimate user may be denied access to r. The 
expected cost in this state is q2(RcA + OcA + Pe). Because ‘false positive detection’ is a false 
detection the same as in case 2, the generated cost is expected to be Rcj + OcA. However, this 
scenario causes an additional penalty cost Pe due to a false response. q2 is a false negative 
detection rate. 
TN cost  
TN Cost is always 0, as it is incurred when a system correctly decides that an event is 
normal. This decision is therefore associated with no Damage Cost, as only Operating Cost 
for maintaining the IDS is required. Section 4 discusses how MCDM is used to quantify 
costs in our cost model. 
The detection algorithm that is embedded within the cost sensitive model is based on the 
description of our proposed cost matrix outcome as described earlier. Figures 3 and 4 
demonstrate our proposed cost model within an improvised decision tree 
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Input: Training data: T= {t1,… tm} where each example Ti has attributes {pi,….pn) and a class ci 
          : Classifier C with learning algorithm L 
         : Misclassification cost, Cij 
          
Output: W: the predicted test class, alarm log, response  
For ∀ T ∈{ti, … tm} 
  C            L(T) 
 Create a Root node for the tree 
Initialize all the weights in T, Wi=1/N, where N is the total number of the examples. 
Calculate the prior probabilities P(Cj) for each class Cj in  T. P (Cj) = ∑ WiC୧  / ∑ Wi୬୧ୀଵ  
Calculate the conditional probabilities P (Aij | Cj) for each attribute values in  T. P (Aij | Cj) = P (A) 
/ ∑ WiC୧  
Calculate the posterior probabilities for each example in D.P(ei | Cj) = P(Cj) Π P(Aij | Cj) 
Update the weights of examples in D with Maximum Likelihood (ML) of posterior probability   
P(Cj|ei);   Wi= PML (Cj|ei) 
 
If (all the examples in T are in the same class ci) 
{ 
   Return (the single node tree Root with label ci) 
} 
Else 
{ 
   Let a be the Best attribute (T) 
   For (each possible value v of a) do 
        { 
          Add a new tree branch below Root, which correspond to the test a = v 
          If (Dv is empty) 
 {   
     Below this branch add a new leaf node with label equal to the common class 
     Value in D. 
 } 
      Else 
       { 
         Below this branch add the subtree (Dv,A-a) 
        } 
 } 
} 
Return Root 
End learning phase 
 
C = {Ti , Tx} 
 For ∀ Tx ∈{Cloned, Fraud} 
 Calculate the expected misclassification cost R(αi⎪x) by equation (10) 
 W= arg minj R(αi⎪x) 
If  DCost > RCost, response is triggered 
 Else store in alarm log 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Pseudo code for misclassification cost by attackers using Decision Tree 
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Input : Training  data : T= {t1,…….., tm} where each example Ti has attributes {pi,….pn) and a class ci 
          : Classifier C with learning algorithm L 
          : Test cost, Mij 
          : SA test : Ts = {t1,…….., tm} where each example Ti has attributes {pi,….pn) and a class ci 
 
Output: W : the predicted class  
For T ∈{ti, … tm} 
 C            L(T) 
 Create a Root node for the tree 
Initialize all the weights in T, Wi=1/N, where N is the total number of the examples. 
Calculate the prior probabilities P(Cj) for each class Cj in  T. P (Cj) = ∑ WiC୧  / ∑ Wi୬୧ୀଵ  
Calculate the conditional probabilities P (Aij | Cj) for each attribute values in  T. P (Aij | Cj) = P (A) 
/ ∑ WiC୧  
Calculate the posterior probabilities for each example in D.P(ei | Cj) = P(Cj) Π P(Aij | Cj) 
Update the weights of examples in D with Maximum Likelihood (ML) of posterior probability   
P(Cj|ei);   Wi= PML (Cj|ei) 
 
For ∀ T ∈{Ts} 
  Calculate the expected test cost R(αi⎪x) by equation (11) 
 
Fig. 4. Pseudo code for test cost by attackers using Decision Tree 
4. Quantifying cloning and fraud cost using MCDM tool 
In this section we use the MCDM approach in quantifying costs. For our purposes, we 
define decision making as the process of choosing among optional alternatives based on 
multiple criteria. For each of these decisions, we consider several factors or criteria and we 
also consider several optional alternatives. In group decision making these criteria and 
alternatives are more complex and must be determined prior to the development of related 
judgment scores or evaluation values. We adopted the simplest method for MCDM, using 
cross tabulation and weighting methods. The following equation describes how cross 
tabulation and weighting is represented: 
 Normalized score , Zk(Oi)  =   
ଵଶ   (1 - ௦௨௠௧௢௧௔௟௦௨௠)  (13) 
 U(Oi)  =   ∑ ܼ݇ሺܱ݅ሻெ௞ୀଵ   X   w(Ck)  (14) 
where Zk(Oi) is the normalised score of option Oi under criterion Ck and w(Ck) is the 
normalised weighting for criterion Ck. The summation of the damage, response and 
operational costs will always be for the representation of ten tags for any conditions such as 
cloned, fraud or for the purpose of testing by SA. Section 4.1 discusses how MCDM is used 
to quantify cost for a RFID tag cloning attack. Section 4.2 describes the evaluation of the cost 
of a fraud attack. 
4.1 MCDM for RFID tags cloning attack  
This section introduces how costs associated with cloning attacks by attackers are quantified 
in a RFID system. Attacker Damage Cost (DcA) and attacker Response Cost (RcA) are the 
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two costs discussed here. DcA is the amount of cost related to the Damage to target 
resources if intrusion detection is unavailable. Two main factors, criticality and lethality 
(Lindqvist & Jonsson, 2007); (Northcutt, 1999) are used to measure and define these costs.  
Criticality measures the importance of the targeted resource of an attack and evaluates it in 
terms of cost to replace, including unavailability and disclosure costs. For instance, the cost 
of replacing cloned RFID tags is much less than the cost of replacing the complete 
organisation database. DcA is a result of combining criticality with the attack category. 
Based on cost measurements factors and based on our problem definition, we use the 
simplest method of applying MCDM, using a cross table with target resources in RFID 
systems (tags, readers, database and RFID network) as criteria; and types of security cloning 
attacks as alternatives. Table 1 displays the ADCost for RFID cloning attack.  
 
Attacks | 
Target 
Resources 
Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical SUM 
Tags 30 15 25 30 100 
Readers 20 30 40 10 100 
Database(local) 20 30 35 15 100 
Network 10 40 40 10 100 
Sum 80 115 140 65 400 
Normalized 
Score 
20.0% 28.8% 35.0% 16.3% 100% 
Table  6. Criticality of RFID components in term of replacing, unavailability and disclosure 
for Damage cost  
 
Tags Reader Database Network Sum 
Importance Level 20 15 30 35 100 
Importance 
Weight 
20.0% 15.0% 30.0% 35.0% 100.0% 
Table 7. Weight Importance of RFID components  
 
Attacks| Costs Weights Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical 
attack  
 
Tags 20.0% 6.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 
Readers 15.0% 3.19 4.79 6.38 1.60 
Database(local) 30.0% 1.58 2.36 2.76 1.18 
Network 35.0% 0.99 3.96 3.96 0.99 
Sum 100.0% 11.8 14.1 18.1 9.8 53.7 
Normalized 
Score 
21.9% 26.3% 33.7% 18.2% 1 
Table 8. Damage Cost (DcA) Evaluation based on scores of attacks and target resources 
factors 
Based on Table 8, we could distinguish the damage cost for each attack using different RFID 
components.For instance, the damage cost for skimming attack on ten RFID tags is USD 
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6.00.‘Man in the middle’ attack has the highest associated Damage Cost, followed by that 
associated with ‘eavesdropping’ attack. ‘Man in the middle’ attack high Damage Cost is 
related to its related probability that all RFID components, especially tags and the network, 
have been compromised. The related impact on the organisation is greater than simply 
replacing the components with new ones. The disclosure of information from the tags and 
database could lead to further losses due to unavailability costs and to future related serious 
security attacks, such as fraud, that could jeopardize the complete RFID system. RFID tags 
are generally exploited more than RFID readers, as they are more vulnerable to attack. This 
fact is supported by RFID tags typically having little or no security measures. In the supply 
chain management environment, RFID tags take up less storage space and are of low cost 
compared to RFID readers. 
RcA is the Response Cost associated with acting upon an alarm. A Response Cost can be 
either manual or automatic and is determined based associated IDS capabilities and 
organisation policies; attack types; and target resources. Measurement of a Response Cost is 
similar to that of a Damage Cost, and includes the factors of criticality and attack category. 
Table 9 displays a Response Cost for a RFID cloning attack.  
 
Attacks | 
Target 
Resources 
Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical Range 
Tags 15 15 30 40 100 
Readers 15 35 40 10 100 
Database(local) 20 25 35 20 100 
Network 20 30 35 15 100 
Sum 70 105 140 85 400 
Normalized 
Score 
17.5% 26.3% 35.0% 21.3% 100% 
Table 9. Criticality of RFID components in term of replacing, unavailability and disclosure 
for Response cost 
 
Attacks| Costs Weights Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical 
attack  
 
Tags 20.0% 3.00 3.00 6.00 8.00 
Readers 15.0% 2.39 5.59 6.38 1.60 
Database(local) 30.0% 1.58 1.97 2.76 1.58 
Network 35.0% 1.98 2.97 3.46 1.48 
Sum 100.0% 8.9 13.5 18.6 12.7 53.7 
Normalized 
Score  
16.7% 25.2% 34.6% 23.6% 1 
Table 10. Response Cost (RcA) Evaluation based on scores of attacks and target resources 
factors 
Based on Table 10, we can conclude that a simpler attack such as a ‘skimming’ attack has a 
much lower Response Cost compared to a complex attack (such as a ‘physical’ attack). This 
is because a ‘physical’ attack requires more complex mechanisms for an effective response. 
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In addition, we have totaled up the relative cost for the Damage and Response Cost to 
calculate the CCost based on formula (2). From Table 11, we could conclude that ‘man in the 
middle’ attack has the highest normalized score. 
 
Costs 
|Attacks 
Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical Sum  
Damage 11.8 14.1 18.1 9.8 53.7 
Response  8.9 13.5 18.6 12.7 53.7 
Sum 20.7 27.6 36.7 22.4 107.5 
Normalized 
Score 
19.3% 25.7% 34.2% 20.9% 100% 
Table 11. Consequential Cost (CC) Evaluation for summation between Damage and 
Response Cost  
4.2 Operational cost 
Operational Cost (OcA)  includes the default cost of running an IDS. This could include the 
amount of time and amount of computing resources needed to extract and test features from 
the raw data stream that is being monitored. In practice, OcA is associated with time. For 
instance, time should be minimised in the detection of a security problem and related 
generation of an alarm, as the longer the time taken, the higher the associated cost. There are 
two cost factors which need careful examining: 1) the computing resource cost per each of 
the four attack types); and 2) the time taken per attack type. To compute the computing 
resource related cost, the different events and transactions that occur in a supply chain need 
to be taken into account. Table 12 depicts the time taken to handle each attack type and 
Table 13 the test features, based on their computing resource related cost. It takes more time 
to handle a ‘physical’ attack than other attack types. This is because a ‘physical’ attack 
requires understanding of cryptanalysis techniques and is associated with a greater amount 
of laboratory work. We have analysed OcA related to the four different cloning attack types 
based on a typical RFID system in an integrated RFID EPCglobal service (Ranasinghe & 
Cole, 2007, Verisign Inc, 2007). 
 
Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical Sum 
Importance Level 15 35 45 60 155 
Importance Weight 9.7% 22.6% 29.0% 38.7% 100.0% 
Table 12. Operational cost relative to time taken in handling 4 cloned attacks. 
The main cost inherent in the operation of an IDS is the amount of time and the computing 
resources needed to extract and test features from the raw data stream that is being 
monitored. We classify features into four relative levels, based on their computational costs: 
• Level 1 features can be computed at the beginning of the service (e.g. tagging) 
• Level 2 features can be computed at any point during the transaction of RFID tags in a 
single plant or site; e.g. Movement of tags in a distributor plant (shipping , receiving) 
• Level 3 features can be computed at the end of a single supply chain tag transaction at 
the end of the plant movement; e.g. Movement and transactions of tags from 
manufacturer to retailer plant 
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Levels L1: 
Computed 
from the 
beginning of 
service (e.g 
tagging) 
L2: 
Computed at 
any events of 
RFID 
movement 
between two 
plants. ( e.g 
shipping, 
receiving). 
L3 : Computed 
at all the 
events in a 
single SCM 
from 
manufacturer 
to retailer(e.g 
tagging, pack, 
shipping, 
receiving) 
L4:Computed at 
the overall of 
operation of 
interconnected 
EPCglobal 
network 
(EPCIS, DNS) 
such as tracing 
and tracking. 
(Involves L1,L2 
and L3) 
Sum 
Importance 
Level 
1 5 10 100 116 
Importance 
Weight 
0.9% 4.3% 8.6% 86.2% 100.0% 
Table 13. Four relative levels of test features based on their computing resources cost for 
Operating Cost (OcA). 
• Level 4 features can be computed at the end of multiple supply chain plants in a 
interconnected network connection, but potentially require access to data of many prior 
connections. These are temporal and statistical features and are the most costly to 
compute. The computation of these features may require values of the lower level (i.e., 
levels 1, 2, and 3) features. Table 10 depicts the four relative test features for different 
attacks.  
 
Features 
|Attacks 
Weights Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical 
attack  
 
L1 0.9% 10.00 15.00 15.00 10.00 
L2 4.3% 11.01 11.01 13.21 8.81
L3 8.6% 21.46 17.17 25.76 17.17 
L4 86.2% 21.41 21.41 26.77 21.41 
Sum 
100.0% 63.9 64.6 80.7 57.4 266.6 
 
Normalized 
Score 
20.7% 20.9% 26.1% 32.4% 1 
Table 14. Operational Cost (OcA) Evaluation based on scores of test features and cloning 
attacks types 
Test features look into the computing resources used in a counter measuring attack. 
‘Physical’ attacks require more testing of raw features and are harder to counter than other 
attack types. In order to calculate Cumulative Cost or overall cost by using formula (3), the 
end result is based on two scenarios: The first scenario is the summation of CCost (Damage 
and Response Cost) with Operational Cost, relative to the cost of the time taken in handling 
the attacks. This is shown in Figure 15. 
Based on Figure 7, Cumulative Cost for a ‘man in the middle’ attack is the highest, followed 
by that for a ‘physical’ attack.  ‘Skimming’ attacks have low overall costs because the attack 
requires less expertise and a lower Response Cost. 
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Features 
|Attacks 
Weights Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical 
attack  
 
Features 70.0% 19.2 19.4 24.2 30.3 
Time  30.0% 0.9 2.0 2.6 3.5 
Sum 100.0% 20.0 21.4 26.8 33.8 102.0 
Normalized 
Score  
19.6% 21.0% 26.3% 33.1% 100.0% 
Table 15. Operational Cost (OcA) Evaluation based on weight for test features and time 
 
 
Fig. 7. Overall Cost Evaluation for summation between Consequential Cost and Operational 
Cost  
4.3 Quantifying RFID tag fraud attack and system administrator testing  
This section looks at DcA and RcA the respective Damage and Response Costs in detecting a 
fraudulent act. Fraud involves injection of products with future EPC codes or past batch 
EPC codes. It involves first cloning and then modifying existing EPC codes. The cost types 
for fraudulent events are similar to that of cloning attacks. The difference is the need to 
monitor the progress of the attack when calculating Damage Cost and Response Cost, as a 
fraud attack has a greater impact on the performance of the system than a cloning attack. 
The contributing factors for its greater impact include: 
a. An inconsistent number of tags and readers 
b. A higher bandwidth 
c. Unauthorized locations /sites visited by tags (as obtained from tracking and tracing 
processes) 
d. The transaction time – greater or smaller than a given transaction time range. 
We consider fraud attacks and SA testing damage (DcS) together since they have similar 
cost impact factors. In a real-time situation, a fraud attack is potentially in progress by the 
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time it is detected, meaning that its measured Damage Cost at a point in time is potentially 
only a part of its total Damage Cost. This is represented by the formula ‘Progress X Damage 
Cost’, where attack progress is represented by the percentage of the attack’s progress. We 
use the simpler ‘skimming’ attack cost ($11.80) obtained from Table 8 when calculating 
fraud attack Damage and Response Costs. Table 16 displays relative costs for fraud attacks 
and associated SA testing. 
 
Progress of 
attacks| 
Attacks  
Progress 
attack 
Damage 
Cost 
(Fraud)  
Progress 
attack for SA 
Damage 
Cost (SA) 
Sum 
Tags Count 1 11.8 1 11.8 
Location 0.8 9.44 0.5 5.9 
Time 0.8 9.44 0.5 5.9 
Bandwidth 0.5 5.9 0.5 5.9 
Sum 36.6 29.5 66.0 
Normalized 
Score  
55% 
 
45% 100% 
Table 16. Cost relative to Damage Cost for fraud attack and SA test and Progress attack 
value  
There is no reason to calculate Response Cost for SA testing, since SA testing is done using 
an upfront authentication mechanism and requires secure identification of a system 
administrator, thus preventing their injection of cloned or fraudulent tags in the system. 
Response Cost is thus associated only with fraud attacks, and not with SA tests. Table 17 
shows the Response Cost for fraud attack and response cost used is similar to response to 
handle skimming attack. The amount of Response Cost is related to the number of affected 
tags. 
 
Progress of attacks| 
Attacks  
Progress attack Response Cost 
(Fraud)  
Sum 
Tags Count 1 8.9 
Location 0.8 7.12 
Time 0.8 7.12 
Bandwidth 0.3 2.67 
Sum 25.8 25.8 
Normalized Score 
 
100% 100% 
Table 17. Cost relative to Response Cost (Attacks vs. Target resources) and Progress attack 
value 
We analyse CCost in terms of its difference between cloning and fraud attacks. The cloning 
Damage and Response Costs are captured from section 4.1. Based on these results, we are 
able to conclude that cloning attacks have higher Damage as well as Response Costs than 
fraud attacks. This occurs because a fraud attack is only part of a cloning attack. A cloning 
attack needs to occur before a fraud attack can occur.  
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Costs |Attacks Cloning Fraud Range 
Damage 53.7 36.6 1-100 
Response 53.7 25.8 1-100 
Sum 107.4 62.4 170.02 
Normalized Score 
63.2% 36.8% 100% 
Table 18. Consequential Cost (CC) Evaluation for summation between Damage and 
Response Cost 
Operating cost for fraud attack will follows the similar formulation in section 4.2. Table 19 
and Table 20, compares both time taken in handling fraud and cloning and test features for 
fraud and cloning. Detection of fraud is much simpler than any cloning attack. This is 
because in practical and based on our theory, fraud tags will have identifiers which are not 
in the system. Thus simple similarity test is good enough to distinguish the EPC tags stored 
in the database. By using similar weight in cloning attack operational example in Table 12, 
we have allocated an average of 30 minutes to detect a fraud attack and features test used 
for skimming attack. 
 
Features 
|Attacks 
Weight
s 
Skimmi
ng 
Eavesdroppi
ng 
MIM Physica
l attack 
Fraud 
attack 
 
L1 0.9% 10.00 15.00 15.00 30.00 63.90 
L2 4.3% 11.01 11.01 13.21 17.62 28.14 
L3 8.6% 21.46 17.17 25.76 25.76 27.43 
L4 86.2% 21.41 21.41 26.77 26.77 17.10 
Sum 100.0% 63.9 64.6 80.7 100.1 136.6 445.9 
Normalized 
Score  
14.3% 14.5% 18.1% 22.5% 30.6% 1 
Table 19. Operational Cost (OcA) Evaluation based on scores of test features for cloning and 
fraud attacks  
 
Features 
|Attacks 
Weights Skimming Eavesdropping MIM Physical 
attack  
Fraud 
attack  
 
Features 70.0% 19.2 19.4 24.2 30.3 19.2 
Time  30.0% 0.9 2.0 2.6 3.5 1.7 
Sum 100.0% 20.0 21.4 26.8 33.8 20.9 122.9 
Normalized 
Score 
16.3% 17.4% 21.8% 27.5% 17.0% 100.0% 
Table 20. Operational Cost Evaluation based on scores of test features and cloning attacks 
types 
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Cumulative Cost calculations for fraud attack are different based on two scenarios. In this 
scenario CCost is added to the relative cost of different test features for computing resource 
related cost and time taken in handling attack (as shown in Figure 20). We have compared 
Cumulative Cost for both cloning and fraud attacks, and though the difference is not great, 
cloning  attacks take up more operating time due to related countermeasures, which causes 
it to have a slightly greater cost. The operational cost for SA testing purposes will be a 
constant figure of 20.0, similar to operational cost to handle skimming attack.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Overall Cost Evaluation for summation between Consequential Cost and Operational 
Cost (Time taken to handled fraud and cloning attacks) 
4.4 Cost model calculation  
This section contains an analysis of cost sensitive and cost insensitive models, and 
introduces a cost model input cost matrix for a detection system.Assuming that we have a 
cloned detection system that functions upfront, we could feed the cost matrix result in our 
cost model. Since our cost system is quantified using the MCDM tool and is based on the 
cost model calculation in Table 3 and Table 4 which are calculated using MCDM in section 
4.1 and 4.3, we could list estimated Damage, Response and Operational Costs according to 
this cost model. The difference between a cost sensitive and cost insensitive model is that a 
cost sensitive method initiates a response if DCost ≥ RCost and corresponds to the cost 
model, whereas a cost insensitive method responds to every predicted intrusion and is 
representative of current brute-force approaches to intrusion detection. Table 21 displays the 
overall cost model calculation for a cloning attack and Table 22 displays the overall cost 
model calculation for a fraud attack. 
Table 23 shows the difference between cost sensitive and cost insensitive models for both 
cloning and fraud attacks. For instance, in a supply chain environment where both fraud 
and cloning are the act of counterfeiting, the total potential loss is estimated based on 
formula (1) in our model and is calculated to be US$1692.90. If this cost sensitive model is 
www.intechopen.com
Supply Chain Management 226 
calculated for cloning attack for ‘skimming attack ’ for ten RFID tags, we will obtained a cost 
reduction of $US77.8 compare to cost insensitive model which gives us $US193.20. On 
average, the risk for our cost sensitive model on ‘skimming attack’ on each RFID tag over 
skimming attack will be estimated at $US7.80. Table 24 displays the cost of $US139 that 
should be bear by an organsation for every ten RFID tags tested. This testing cost is much 
lesser than 10% of the overall cost of counterfeiting and worth to be considered as well in 
any intrusion detection system. 
 
Cost types| Cost 
matrice 
FN FP 
(DCost 
≥ Rcost)
TP 
(DCost 
≥ 
Rcost) 
TP 
(DCost 
< 
Rcost) 
TP (∀ ∈ E’ 
SA) 
TN  
 Sum  
ADCost(Cloning) 53.7 53.7 53.7 0 
Operational Cost 102 102 102 102 102 102 
ARCost(Cloning) 53.7 53.7 0 
Penalty 20 20 0 
Sum 155.7 175.7 155.7 155.7 175.7 102 920.5 
Normalized 
Score 
16.9% 19.1% 16.9% 16.9% 19.1% 11% 100.0% 
Table 21. Overall cost calculation for ten cloned attack  
 
Cost types| 
Cost matrice 
FN FP 
(DCost 
≥ Rcost) 
TP 
(DCost 
≥ Rcost) 
TP 
(DCost 
< 
Rcost) 
TP (∀ ∈ 
E’ SA) 
TN   Sum 
ADCost 
(fraud) 
36.6 36.6 36.6 0 
 
Operational 
Cost 
20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 
 
ARCost(fraud) 26 26 0 
Penalty 20 20 0 
Sum 57.5 66.9 46.9 57.5 77.5 20.9 327.2 
Normalized 
Score 
17.6% 20.4% 14.3% 17.6% 23.7% 6.4% 100% 
Table 22. Overall cost calculation for fraud attack 
 
Attacks| Cost model  Cost Insensitive Cost Sensitive  Sum  
Cloning  920.5 331.4 
Fraud 327.2 113.8 
Counterfeiting (Sum) 
1247.7 445.2 1692.9 
Normalized Score 73.7% 26.3% 100% 
Table 23. Cost Model for cloning, fraud and counterfeiting  
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Cost types| 
Cost matrice 
FN FP (DCost 
≥ Rcost) 
TP (∀ ∈ E’ 
SA) 
TN  
  
SDCost 29.5 29.5 0 
Operational  20 20 20 
Penalty 20 0 
Sum 49.5 69.5 20 139 
Normalized 
Score 
35.6% 0.0% 50.0% 14.4% 100.0% 
Table 24. Cost Model calculated for SA testing (using matrix in table 5) 
5. RFID tag prevention techniques using MCDM 
In this section we apply Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and MCDM approaches (for 
different units of range) to select optimal supply chain authentication techniques and RFID 
tag authenticity verification methods.  
AHP is a structured technique for dealing with complex decision making. AHP is a decision  
making tool that can describe a general decision making process by decomposing a complex 
problem into a multi- level hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria, sub criteria and 
alternatives, and is a well-known decision theory model developed by Saaty (1990). Its 
primary attribute is quantifying relative priorities for a given set of alternatives on a ratio 
scale, based on the judgment of the decision-maker. It provides an easy way to incorporate 
multiple experts’ opinions and control of consistency in judgments. In addition, the AHP 
method ensures high repeatability and scalability controls. Applications of AHP have been 
reported in numerous fields such as conflict resolution, project selection, budget allocation, 
transportation, health care, and manufacturing (Harker, 1989). 
AHP determines the criteria weightings indirectly based on scores of relative importance for 
each in pair-wise comparisons. The comparison ratings are on a scale of 1 to 9, resulting in a 
ratio of importance for each pair with the maximum difference that one criterion is 9 times 
more important than another. A matrix of pair-wise comparisons is determined in this way 
(where Ci / Cj is just shorthand for the relative importance of Ci to Cj). In AHP, the final 
weightings for the criteria are the normalised values of the eigenvector that is associated 
with the maximum eigenvalue for this matrix. Saaty (1980) suggests that this procedure is 
the best way to minimise the impact of inconsistencies in the ratios. Consistency Ratio is a 
comparison between Consistency Index and Random Consistency Index, or, in formula: 
 ܥܴ ൌ ஼ூோூ (15) 
We utilise the AHP tool in distinguishing the best approach and algorithm for preventing 
RFID tag cloning attacks in supply chains, and which is also suitable for use in testing 
processes used by SAs. In addition, we extend the MCDM tool based on criteria that best 
suit supply chain owners’ needs when selecting RFID tag cloning and fraud prevention 
techniques. Among the defined criteria are acceptance, cost, security and complexity.  
5.1 AHP tool for SA prevention techniques 
In this section, we observe two different approaches. The first approach show the different 
methods used by SAs to handle authentications and select of algorithms. The second 
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approach uses trust analysis based on tag cloning and fraud prevention techniques.  The 
MCDM model can also be used in selecting the best tag cloning and fraud prevention 
approaches and the best approach for authentication that can be used by the System 
Administrator (SA) in testing the system.  
Authentication is an essential element of a typical security model. It is the process of 
confirming the identification of a user (or in some cases, a machine) that is trying to log on 
or access resources. While authentication verifies the user’s identity, authorisation verifies 
that the user in question has the correct permissions and rights to access the requested 
resource. The two work together: Authentication occurs first, then authorisation. In a RFID 
enabled supply chain management tracking and tracing system website, authentication and 
authorisation are essential. Based on organisational role, role based access control can be 
employed in which the administrator at each site are responsible for their own site. For 
instance, an administrator is only able to view other supply chain partner reports and not 
able to edit or delete them. In an IDS system, one of the SA tasks are to monitor and 
maintain the availability and execution of the detection system.  
In addition, SAs are also responsible to test the system to ensure the IDS system is still 
relevant and able to detect cloned and fraud tags precisely. Thus, appropriate and secure 
modes of authentication approaches are required to ensure that the SA account is always 
protected. SAs can be authenticated by entering a password, inserting a smart card and 
entering the associated PIN, providing a fingerprint; voice pattern sample; retinal scan;, or 
using some other means to prove to the system that they are who they claim to be. 
Biometrics such as fingerprints, voice patterns or retinal scans are just a few of human traits 
known to be uniquely used in authentication. Biometric authentication is normally the most 
secure and the hardest to be compromised or cracked. 
Single Sign-On (SSO) is a feature that allows a user to use one password (or smart card) to 
authenticate to multiple servers on a network without re-entering credentials.  IP Security 
(IPSec) provides a means for users to encrypt and/or sign messages that are sent across the 
network to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. IPSec transmissions can 
use a variety of authentication methods, including the Kerberos protocol or using public key 
certificates issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA). By using AHP approach, we have 
analysed the authentication alternatives against criteria such as processing time, cost, 
security and complexity. These criteria are the required validation factors for any 
authentication method .Table 25 shows an example on how to calculate overall weight for 
alternatives using AHP.  The AHP model results as shown in Table 25 indicates that the 
biometrics method provides the most appropriate authentication mode in terms of security 
and minimal time in processing the public key fingerprint.  
Pair-wise comparison generally refers to any process of comparing entities in pairs to judge 
which entity is either preferred; or is found to have a greater amount of some quantitative 
property. The normalized principal Eigen vector is also called the priority vector. Since it is 
normalized, the sum of all the elements in priority vector is 1. The priority vector indicates 
the elements’ relative weights. 
A comparison of the different authentication methods used by supply chain partners 
indicates the following authentication results: Sign on (38.08%); biometrics (41.74%) and 
IPSec (15.86%). Biometrics is most popular authentication method, followed by the sign on 
method. The Consistency Ratio of these figures is less than 10%, which is acceptable due to 
the subjective nature of the measurement factors. The subjective judgment needs to be 
revised if the Consistency Ratio is greater than 10%. 
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Criterias  Processing 
Time 
Cost Security Complexity 
Processing Time 1 1 5 1 
Cost 5 1 7 1 
Security 0.2 0.14285714 1 3 
Complexity 1 0.11 0.14 1 
Sum 7.2 2.25 13.14 6 
 
Criterias   Sum Priority 
Vector 
Processing  0.14 0.44 0.38 0.17 1.13 28.25% 
Cost 0.69 0.44 0.53 0.17 1.84 45.94% 
Security 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.50 0.67 16.68% 
Complexity  0.14 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.37 9.13% 
Sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 100.00% 
           
Techniques Sign on Biometrics IPSEC
Sign on  1.00 1.00 7.00
Biometrics 1.00 1.00 3.00
IPSEC 0.14 0.33 1.00
Sum 2.14 2.33 11.00
Normalised Matrix for Only Processing Time Criterion Sum Priority vector 
0.467 0.429 0.636 1.532 51.05% 
0.467 0.429 0.273 1.168 38.93% 
0.067 0.143 0.091 0.300 10.01% 
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 100.0% 
lambda max 3.104
consistency index (CI) 5.20%  n = 3 
consistency ratio (CR) 8.97%
 
Processing Time Cost Security Complexity Overall Weight 
Weight 36.69% 36.69% 7.47% 2.17%
Sign on 51.05% 25.78% 30.01% 61.44% 38.08% 
Biometrics 38.93% 44.40% 42.82% 22.50% 41.74% 
IPSEC 10.01% 21.40% 23.35% 32.87% 15.86% 
Overall Consistency of Hierarchy 5.64% 
Table 25. SA Criteria’s and Techniques for Testing Cost Using AHP tool 
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   MD5 SHA  PKI              Overall Weight 
Weight 22.30% 22.30% 55.40% 
MD5 40.98% 40.98% 40.98% 40.98% 
SHA 47.36% 47.36% 47.36% 47.36% 
PKI 11.66% 11.66% 11.66% 11.66% 
Overall Consistency of Hierarchy: 7.06% 
Table 26. SA Criteria’s and Algorithms for Testing Cost Using AHP tool 
We have evaluated three different public key algorithms (PKI, MD5 and SHA) that can be 
used in different algorithm approaches by applying AHP approach as shown in Table 24. 
Certificate services are part of a network’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); have been 
applied in EPC global service; and are applicable to RFID systems (EPCGlobal Certificate 
Profile, 2008). Standards for the most commonly used digital certificates are based on X.509 
specifications. In a public key cryptography, a ‘fingerprint’ is created by applying the 
keyboard hash function to a public key. SHA and MD5 are examples of ‘fingerprint’ 
algorithms. 
Theoretically, MD5 and SHA1 are algorithms for computing a 'condensed representation' of 
a message or a data file. This uniqueness enables the message digest to act as a 'fingerprint' 
of the message. Among the algorithms used for SA authentication, SHA is the best 
algorithm to use (as shown in table 26). This is because SHA provides more strength of 
security compare to MD5 algorithm. However the disadvantage of the SHA algorithm is 
that it requires more storage space for its key management functionality.  
5.2 MCDM for tag’s authenticy 
The second part is an evaluation of different tag authentication methods through the use of 
various supply chain criteria, applying the MCDM approach (usage of ranking with 
different range). The supply chain criteria are selected based on the assumption that a 
supply chain company that is willing to spend minimal whilst still maintaining the 
appropriate security features standard for their low cost tags; and curbing both cloning and 
fraud attacks on their tags. Table 27 displays the most appropriate tag authentication for a 
supply chain based on our analysis (M.Mahinderjit Singh &  L.Xue., 2009). 
 
Criterias|Techniques EPC 
Design
Tags 
Design
Lightweight 
Protocol 
Lightweight 
ECC 
Steganography 
  
Acceptance 3 4 1 2 5 
Cost 3 5 1 2 4 
Security 1 2 5 3 4 
Complexity 2 1 3 4 5 
Sum 9 12 10 11 18 60 
Normalized Score 21.25% 20.00% 20.83% 20.42% 17.50% 100% 
1 = Best ; 2 = Good ; 3 = Fair ; 4 = Weak ; 5 = Bad 
Table 27. Evaluation based on rank scores of Tag’s authencity Techniques for Various 
Supply Chain Criterias 
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The value of each row is either 1,2,3, 4 or 5 and represent the rank (shown in Table 27). Since 
smaller rank value is more preferable than higher rank value. Table 28 indicates that each 
criterion has a different range. For instance, the range for cost is in indicated in dollars in 
contrast to that for acceptance which is indicated in rank. It is not viable to the sum of the 
values of the different multiple criteria does not deliver a valid result. We need to transform 
the score of each factor according to its range value so that all factors have comparative 
ranges. 
 
Criterias|       
Techniques 
EPC 
Design 
Tags 
Design 
Lightweight 
Protocol 
Lightweight 
ECC 
Steganography Range 
Acceptance 3 4 1 2 5 1-5 
Cost 
1.5 5 0.5 1 2 
$0.5 -
$5.00 
Security 1 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.3-1 
Complexity 2 1 3 4 5 1-5 
Sum 7.5 10.8 4.8 7.6 12.5 43.2 
Normalized 
Score 
20.66% 18.75% 22.22% 20.60% 17.77% 100% 
Table 28. Evaluation based on range scores of Tag’s authencity Techniques for Various 
Supply Chain Criterias 
We transform the score value of each factor to have the same range value of 0 to 1. A 
formula based on the simple geometry of a line segment is used to linearly convert the score 
of each factor from table 28 to table 30 to a single shared range. 
 new score =  (original score – olb) + nlb     (16)  
Each factor has different importance weightings based on its organisation’s priorities. Since 
the weighting is a subjective value, the result changes with changes to the factors’ 
weightings. Table 29 displays an example of organisation ‘A ‘are weighting priorities in 
selecting their most appropriate tag authentication methodology. 
 
Acceptance Cost Security Complexity Sum 
Importance 
Level 
20 40 30 10 100 
Importance 
Weight 
20.0% 40.0% 30.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Table 29. Supply Chain Criteria’s Weight of Importance 
Table 30 shows the end result of normalizing the weighting of each factor, demonstrating 
the opportunity for an organization to compare different based factors based on a 
normalised range where individual factors are weighed according to the organization’s 
personal requirements and needs. We are able to demonstrate that, for a organisation ‘A’ 
that emphasizes cost factors over security factors, a lightweight ECC would be the most 
appropriate technique for securing their low cost tags. This result contraindicates the 
prediction that lightweight ECC might be the preferred way in the future for securing low 
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cost tags. This prediction is based on the fact that lightweight ECC uses only 64K of RFID 
tag storage and provides strong authenticity comparable to that of any other lightweight 
public key infrastructure. 
 
Criterias| 
Techniques 
Weights EPC 
Design
Tags 
Design
Light-
weight 
Protocol 
Lightweight 
ECC 
Stegano-
graphy 
Acceptance 20.0% -0.100 -0.100 -0.200 -0.150 0.200 
Cost 40.0% 0.011 -0.067 0.033 0.022 -0.033 
Security 30.0% -0.071 -0.043 0.029 -0.014 -0.029 
Complexity 10.0% 0.150 0.200 0.100 0.050 -0.200 
Sum 100.0% -0.010 -0.010 -0.038 -0.092 -0.062 -0.212 
Normalized 
Score  
4.9% 4.5% 18.0% 43.4% 0.292134831 100.0% 
Table 30. Supply Chain Criteria’s and Techniques Weighted scores 
6. Applicability discussions  
In this section, we analyze how well MCDM quantified costs associated with cloning and 
fraud attacks. In the first part we discuss on the MCDM quantified cost result for cloning 
attack. The second part discusses the cost results obtained for fraud attacks, and for SA tests 
and authentication exercises. Finally, we analyze the validity of using cost sensitive and cost 
insensitive models for costing purposes.  
6.1 RFID Tag cloning attack  
Based on the result obtained from the MCDM approach, a ‘man in the middle’ attack has the 
highest Damage Cost of all attacks. This shows that a high Damage Cost is not associated 
with highly complex attacks (e.g. ‘physical’ attacks) or with easy attacks (e.g. ‘skimming’ 
attacks), but with specific techniques used in and means of the attack taking place. Although 
unavailability and disclosure Damage associated with ‘man in the middle’ attacks has an 
high risk impact on the occurrence of future cloning and fraud attacks,  simpler attacks have 
a much lower Response Cost.  
A comparison of consequential costs (the summation of Damage and Response Costs) 
indicate that both ‘eavesdropping’ and MIM attacks have a higher consequential cost than 
other attacks. Time factors are used in the ranking system, correspondent to the level of 
complexity in detecting and responding to the attack, to calculate Operational Costs 
associated with an IDS handling a cloning or fraud attack. MCDM criteria include extracted 
test features from raw RFID streams. There are four different levels of extracting test 
features. Our results indicate that highest rank extracted test features are from an 
interconnected supply chain partner’s organisation within an EPCglobal service, due to the 
difficulty in obtaining shared computing resources between different partners and 
establishing various EDI services among them.  
Cumulative Cost calculations indicate the association of the highest cumulative Operational 
Costs with ‘man in the middle’ attacks and of the lowest costs with ‘skimming’ attacks. 
Based on this information, we conclude that ‘man in the middle’ cloning attacks cause the 
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greatest overall losses in terms of money, time and computing resources. This result implies 
that measures to prevent ‘man in the middle ‘cloning attacks in a supply chain management 
is likely to minimise the impact of counterfeiting on an organisation.  
The prevention measures that could be taken in eliminating MIM attacks include: 1) refresh 
the tag secret key immediately after a reader has been authenticated; 2) maintain  tag output  
changes, as this minimises opportunities for replay attacks and the related risk of a faked 
tag; 3) keep the number of communication rounds and operation stages minimal to avoid 
redundant operations; maintain scalability and eliminate the risk of ‘man in the middle; and 
4) design the coordinating global item tracking server to include a timely tracking system 
that maintains freshness necessary due to the randomness of keys used in inter-
organisational item-tracking activities.  
6.2 RFID tag fraud, SA testing and authentication techniques 
The main differences between fraud and cloning attacks in regards to the similar Damage; 
response; and Operational Cost types, are based on the criteria factors used in applying a 
MCDM tool to calculate these costs. Fraud attack costs are associated with the progress of 
the attack rather than with the type of attack that contributed to it. This is due to the fact that 
a fraud attack occurs only after a tag has successfully been cloned after one or more 
previous attacks. The progress of a fraud attack is closely associated with inconsistency of 
tag count, related to the travel of tags to unauthorised locations:; the need for a higher 
bandwidth for fraud detection in unauthorised locations; and inconsistencies between travel 
timeframes associated with illegal tags.  Similar criteria factors are used to calculate costs 
associated with SA testing. 
In a comparison of CCost for cloning and fraud attacks, the latter attack type has 
significantly lower associated CCost. This is due to the fact that fraud attacks are a part of 
cloning attack SA test costs are calculated using only Damage Cost, as SAs do not have 
malicious intentions towards the system and are able to use the system only after their 
system authentication, which is transparent during system audit procedures, classified as 
usage by a legal and authorised user.  
Biometric authentication methods are the most secure and suitable method for use by 
supply chain partners in supply chain management, as indicated by the AHP tool. The SHA 
algorithm can be used to create a ‘fingerprint’ for the public key of this biometric 
application. Tag authentication methods that minimise storage needs and use minimal key 
bits are preferred, such as lightweight public cryptography (e.g. ECC and lightweight 
protocol).  
6.3 Cost sensitive vs. Cost insensitive 
We have extended the MCDM tool for evaluating CCost (Damage and Response Costs) 
calculations in our cost model. The aim for calculating both Damage and Response Costs is 
the evaluation the cost impact of a cost sensitive vs. that of a cost insensitive cost model. The 
difference between the cost impact of a cost sensitive and cost insensitive model is that a 
cost sensitive model initiates an SA alert only if DCost ≥ RCost and if it corresponds to the 
cost model. Cost insensitive methods, in contrast, respond to every predicted intrusion and 
are demonstrated by current brute-force approaches to intrusion detection.  
Estimation of losses indicates that it could be reduced by up to 73% if a cost sensitive model 
is used in a system.  
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This impressive result is obtained using quantified cost for counterfeiting; and indicate that 
to optimally curb both cloning and fraud attacks, it is necessary to aim to minimise false 
negative in a system rather than to optimise accuracy of detection and elimination of false 
positives. The underlying principle for every business model should remain to minimise 
financial losses without compromising system security or product quality.  
In addition our RFID cost model also included testing cost operated on the detector system 
by supply chain employee; the system administrator. The result display that testing cost 
only takes up less than 10% for every misclassifications cost reported. As the role of testing 
indicates the relevance of IDS and boost the accuracy of the dataset rules, the component of 
testing should never be compromised on the ground of losses in dollar.  
The result also indicates the significance of calculating both misclassification and testing cost 
in any cost model.  
7. Conclusions and future research 
In this chapter, we have proposed cost-based approach using MCDM tool to quantify cost 
when curbing counterfeiting in RFID-enabled SCM. We have extended this tool to analyze 
the different authentication approaches, including for tag authentication, which can be used 
by system administrators. We have shown that the MCDM approach could be used for 
implementing a practical cost-sensitive model, as validated by our analytical results. We 
contend that the definitions of damage; response; and operational costs are complex, 
especially when applying theoretical attack criticality and progress attack in determining 
cloning and fraud costs. Our future work will focus on the implementation of our cost 
model and on development of robust RFID tag detectors for cloning and fraud attacks. We 
will use the cost model to estimate costs to predict total financial losses related to RFID tag 
cloning and fraud.  
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